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AI Economic Scenarios 2030

How much could AI move GDP, wages, the labor share and unemployment by 2030? This model starts from the task-based framework in Korinek, Jones, Sacher, Cotter and McCrory's working paper Economic Scenarios for Transformative AI. Pick a scenario, then change any assumption.

What is from the paper and what is ours. The production model, the 2024 calibration, the three presets' parameters, and the small “Paper” comparison figures come from the working paper (PDF). The unemployment reabsorption mechanism, power and chip caps, investment feedback, policy levers and hyperscaler signal are WealthLanding's own reverse-engineered, illustrative additions. They are not from Anthropic or the authors.

Explore the scenarios

How the model works

The economy produces output from many task instances combined with a constant-elasticity (CES) aggregator, with elasticity of substitution σ (0.5 by default, so tasks are complements). A share mt of the economy's labor tasks is exposed to AI (cognitive work). Within that, a share dt of instances is actually done with AI, so mtdt is the effective AI share. Each AI instance is eat times more productive. Of the AI-performed work, a share ψ is automated (done by capital) and the rest is augmented (a worker using AI). Each automated instance creates ρ new labor tasks (reinstatement). Capital is supplied with elasticity ε = 3 with respect to its rental rate.

A note on notation. In the paper and on this page, ψ is the automation share and ρ is reinstatement. The share of work performed with AI is the product md. It is not a separate parameter.

Paths over time (paper)

mt=m¯1+e−κm(t−tm),κm=13.5ln[m¯−m2026m2026·m2030m¯−m2030]

The same logistic form applies to dt with ceiling 1. The mid-2026 anchors are m = 0.14 and d = 0.10, and the exposure ceiling is m¯ = 0.624 (cognitive share of labor income). Productivity rises linearly: at=a2026+ga(t−2026.5).

Closed-form solution (paper, Proposition 1, uniform parameters)

sL,t=1−[sK0+sL0ψmd(e−(1−σ)a−ρ)]e(1−σ)x
ℓ~N=−ln(1−md[1−ρψ−(1−ψ)e−(1−σ)a])
Δlnw=ΔlnsL+ℓ~N1−σ,Δln(Y/L)=Δlnw−ΔlnsL
εx=ΔlnK=ln1−sLsK0+Δln(Y/L)−x

Here x=Δlnr is the gap in the rental rate of capital. The page solves for it numerically by bisection (the root is unique). The base year is 2024, with labor share sL0 = 0.60. The cognitive-employment target is ℓ~C≈−(sN0/sC0)ℓ~N.

WealthLanding's illustrative additions

  • Unemployment. The paper models search and matching with sticky wages. This page uses a simpler stand-in. When the cognitive-employment target falls, the displaced workers join an excess pool Pt. Each month a fraction h/12 of the pool is rehired, so Ut=U¯+Pt with U¯ = 3.8%. The preset speeds (1.1, 1.3 and 0.25 per year) were tuned so that 2030 unemployment lands near the paper's published values.
  • GDP with unemployment. ΔlnY≈Δln(Y/L)+sL0ln1−Ut1−U¯. Growth in year t is the 12-month change in this gap plus the 2% baseline.
  • Power and chip caps. If power or chips can deliver only a fraction c of what the scenario needs by 2030, the rise in d and a above their mid-2026 levels is scaled down. The scaling phases in linearly, reaching a factor of c = min(power, chips) in 2030.
  • Compute tax. This scales the same rise by 1−τ, using an assumed adoption elasticity of 1.
  • Investment feedback. Diffusion is multiplied by 1+min(0.25,φ·gapt−1), capped at d ≤ 1. A larger economy funds more AI deployment, and the bound prevents runaway paths.
  • Retraining. This raises the reabsorption speed h by the chosen percentage.
  • Transfers/UBI. Worker household income = labor income + T × (capital income above the no-AI level). It is shown relative to baseline labor income.
  • Hyperscaler signal. Signal S is the average of two parts, each clipped to [−1, 1]: (average cloud growth − 20) / 40, and (CapEx growth year over year − 20) / 80. When the toggle is on, d2030←d2030(1+0.2·S·strength). If you enter an AI revenue share, it also nudges a2030 by up to ±0.10. The reference points are WealthLanding judgment calls, not estimates.

Assumptions and limits

  • The paper's model, and this one, leave out robotics, aggregate-demand effects and an intertemporal saving (Euler) decision. The paper's ideas channel is small, and it is omitted here.
  • The paper allows parameters to differ across occupations. This page uses one uniform value for each parameter.
  • The average wage here is the full-employment wage from the closed form. The paper's figure also reflects wage rigidity, so ours differs, most visibly in the Extreme preset.
  • Results are gaps relative to a no-AI path with 2% growth. They are not forecasts.

Preset values (paper Table 1) and published 2030 results (Table 3)

Source: Korinek et al. (2026), Tables 1 and 3. Reabsorption speeds are WealthLanding's calibration.
Parameter / resultModestSubstantialExtreme
m₂₀₃₀0.200.300.50
d₂₀₃₀0.200.400.60
a mid-2026 → 20300.30 → 0.300.35 → 0.450.45 → 0.80
ψ (automation share)0.500.750.90
ρ (reinstatement)0.500.250
GDP above no-AI, 20301.6%8.3%32.4%
GDP growth, 20302.4%5.4%15.4%
Labor share, 203059.4%56.1%45.2%
Unemployment, 20303.9%4.6%11.9%

What it means for you

Career

In every preset, the pressure falls on cognitive tasks that AI can perform end to end. The model's key lever is reinstatement (ρ). Roles that keep creating new tasks for people hold up better. Building skills that sit next to AI, such as judgment, client relationships, and supervising AI output, matches the augmentation side of ψ. A larger emergency fund is a hedge against the slow-reabsorption case.

Investing themes

Higher-AI scenarios move income from labor to capital and raise the return on capital. They also lean on power, chips and data-center build-outs, which the caps above make explicit. These are themes for understanding the economy, not picks. Diversification still matters, because the same scenario that lifts AI-linked capital can hurt other sectors.

Policy

Try the policy sliders. Retraining shortens the unemployment hump. Transfers can keep worker household income at or above baseline even when the labor share falls. The paper estimates that a transfer of about 9% of GDP would keep cognitive workers' income at its no-AI level in the Extreme case. A compute tax slows adoption, which trades growth for a gentler transition.

Not investment advice. This page is an educational model. It is not a forecast, and it is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security. Talk to a qualified professional about your own situation.

Sources

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